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Abstract
In this paper we identify four main problems that arise from a quantitative cap on land
use, land-use change and forestry activities discussed at COP 6. These problems relate
to environmental integrity and economic efficiency. First, in stark contrast to the
wording of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change and the
Kyoto Protocol the proposed provisions for land use, land use change and forestry
activities are only about carbon accounting and are devoid of sustainability criteria. This
deficiency would make climate actions inconsistent with other international agreements
and policy processes. Second, due to lower costs of sequestration activities a
quantitative cap produces possibilities for arbitrage in the greenhouse gas market. Third,
in a situation of oversupply a fair allocation of highly profitable sequestration projects is
unlikely. Fourth, negotiators are overwhelmed by the complexity of the land use, land-
use change and forestry issue.
The currently proposed mechanisms, such as adaptation levies or discounted crediting
of flexibilities, do not provide adequate solutions. In order to solve these problems we
propose a tender auction mechanism that could already be applied today for forest sinks.
We distinguish between two information components in this economic mechanism.
First, a qualifier component in the form of certification for sustainable forest
management practices, which is already in use by market actors worldwide. Second, a
competitive trait in the form of carbon sequestration intensities per greenhouse gas
emission credit. Under such a regime, negotiators simply need to determine a
quantitative cap (as they already started to negotiate at COP 6), while an efficient
market mechanism guarantees integrity with respect to sustainability and economic
efficiency criteria. The complexity of the issues surrounding land use, land use change
and forestry activities is transferred to a decentralized decision making process. The
proposed mechanism can also serve as a template for clean development mechanism
projects and other international flexible mechanisms or subsidy programs.
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environmental and social integrity of forest related
LULUCF activities under the Kyoto Protocol
Michael Obersteiner, Ewald Rametsteiner and Sten Nilsson
Kyoto in Context
Kyoto is not just about the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) of 5.2% over the
period from 1990 to 2010. After publication of the latest Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC, 2001) report and obeying the binding commitments under the
United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) policy makers
have to realize that it is about starting a process that should, ultimately, reduce GHGs to
at least 40% of 1990 levels over the next 50 years. This process also needs to be
embedded in a wider concept that ensures compatibility with other commonly agreed
global goals, most importantly those related to the sustainable development paradigm.
Climate change and sustainable development are intimately connected. A formal sign
for this connection is that the UNFCCC was opened for signature at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The
UNFCCC itself is very explicit about this in stressing that the Convention’s objective is
embedded in a wider concept of sustainable development by stating, inter alia, in
Article 3.4 as a principle: “The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable
development”. In Article 3.5, the Convention recognizes the importance of merging
economic efficiency with environmental and social integrity in one international system.
The Kyoto Protocol, set up in pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention, states
explicitly to “Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention” and re-emphasizes the
central objective of promoting sustainable development in Article 2.1. Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol also demands sustainable development as the ultimate goal for
mechanisms with non-Annex I Parties. However, the currently designed mechanisms of
the Protocol are devoid of elements that would aim at an alignment of GHG reductions
with the broader concept of sustainable development (see, e.g., Killmann, 2000). This is
a serious problem. Even more serious is, however, that sink activities as currently
discussed stand too often in stark contrast to other international agreements, such as
those related to biodiversity (Convention on Biological Diversity ― CBD) and
desertification (Convention to Combat Desertification ― CCD) (Oberthuer and Ott,
2000), and are not interconnected with work and achievements of other emerging or
existing international regimes related to sustainable development in the United Nations
(UN) family, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), the
2Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) or the newly established UN Forum on
Forests (UNFF) in the forest related policy arena.
Substantive discussions on the issue of “sinks” and the land use, land-use change and
forestry (LULUCF) sector started late in the preparatory process for the Kyoto Protocol
and consultations and negotiations on sinks were widely unrelated to governmental
negotiations in other UN fora. Consultations were furthermore seemingly characterized
by a lack of available knowledge and the necessity of a decision on sinks, given the
impossibility to define the level of emission commitments without deciding on the
inclusion or exclusion of sinks. The inclusion of sinks finally allowed some parties to
accept the text of the Kyoto Protocol, as it offered prospects of actually being able to
fulfill the commitments also in “realpolitik” circumstances. Substantive discussions on
sinks and the LULUCF sector did not commence until late in the Ad hoc Group on the
Berlin Mandate (AGBM) process (Depledge, 2000). Only after the Kyoto Protocol was
fully negotiated was the IPCC asked to bring some light into the unclear and unresolved
complex questions related to the so-called LULUCF.
The result is known. Under the Kyoto Protocol, certain human-induced activities in the
LULUCF sector may now be used by Annex I Parties to offset their emission targets. In
fact, at the COP 6 meeting in The Hague policy makers tried to strike a deal on a
quantitative cap since ‘science could not bring them any further’ in the negotiations
(Pronk, 2001). The activities allowed should remove greenhouse gases from the
atmosphere. However, devils hide in many technical details. The biggest problem is that
the ‘product’ is not yet defined and difficult to measure by nature. Uncertainty and
verification of net fluxes, including variability, leakage, non-permanence, attributability
and accountability issues still remain largely unresolved (see, e.g., Nilsson et al., 2000;
Obersteiner et al., 2000a; Valentini et al., 2000; Jackson et al., 2001). For a good part of
these, there is no simple feasible solution on the horizon that is scientifically sound and
practical enough for business operations on larger scales.
The future fate of the Kyoto Protocol will, to a good part, depend on feasible solutions
to the political and technical dilemmas related to the sink issues that first allowed the
Kyoto agreement and later brought the negotiation process close to a halt at COP 6 in
2000.
It is vital to respond to the widely perceived threat of an incompatible and in some
contexts damaging international regime. In addition, it is important to adjust the
currently proposed Kyoto Protocol instruments to be in line with the overarching
objective of other environment related global international regimes, especially those
working towards sustainable development.
Objective
The objective of the paper is to propose a mechanism for the forest related parts of
LULUCF within the Kyoto Protocol that:
• contributes to achieving the carbon reduction goal of the Kyoto Protocol,
3• is in line with the overall objective of sustainable management of resources and
thus compatible with other international regimes such as the CBD, CCD and the
United Nations Council for Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and
• is consistent with the market mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.
Methodical Approach
We follow a stepwise approach. In the first step, we review the currently implemented
international provisions for sustainable forest management (SFM). We then describe the
options that are, in principle, available to manage a LULUCF cap and put these into
perspective according to a number of parameters measuring economic, environmental
and social performance under these options. In the third step, we briefly sketch the
accounting problems that are associated with forest related LULUCF activities. Finally,
we describe the Dutch Tender Auction mechanism. We also show that this approach is
(1) practical, (2) in line with the overarching objective of other international regimes
related to forests, namely to sustainable development, and (3) leads to improved
economic efficiency.
Ensuring Compatibility of Forest Related LULUCF
Contributions with Sustainability Objectives
Key areas of Agenda 21 related to forests (Chapter 11), and of the follow-up work of
the UNCSD, are to sustain the multiple roles and functions of all types of forests, forest
lands and woodlands, and to enhance the protection, sustainable management and
conservation of all forests.
In support of the work by UNCSD, over the past decade considerable progress was
made worldwide by governmental institutions, including the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Tropical Timber Organisation
(ITTO), and regional processes, such as the Ministerial Conference on the Protection of
Forests in Europe (MCPFE), to develop and use criteria and indicators to define,
monitor and report progress towards SFM. Over 140 countries are currently involved in
one or more of the nine major international processes aimed at the development and
implementation of such criteria and indicator (C&I) sets for SFM. As of today, a global
set of seven or eight national level criteria has emerged from these decentralized but
loosely coordinated processes to define sustainability in forestry in operational terms.
Such criteria and indicators for SFM but also, to the extent available, for sustainable
agriculture, wetland or grassland management would allow to distinguish whether
initiatives or projects are geared towards or against the ultimate aim of both the
Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the promotion of sustainable resource
management.
Apart from and parallel to the operationalization of the abstract definition of sustainable
development in the forest sector, private sector activities have emerged on global,
4regional and national levels to define and elaborate operational standards, including
criteria and indicators for the assessment os SFM on the operational level with the aim
to certify ‘well managed’ or ‘sustainably managed’ forests. Certification as such is a
market based instrument to communicate high quality/sustainable forest management.
Forest certification is based on assessment by an independent external party on whether
forest management meets certain quality requirements. Today, certification is, like the
work on the governmental level on the development of C&I sets, a global phenomenon
with an increasingly stable and working international institutional structure for the
verification of claims related to forest management. As is the case for the work on C&I
sets, forest certification initiatives are characterized by their adaptation to different
regional circumstances. Not only have these initiatives achieved in coming up with
regionally differentiated and adapted solutions to global problems, they have also had
almost one decade to devise and adapt mechanisms and solutions. This constitutes a
tremendous asset over any new attempts to design and establish new mechanisms, given
the existing limits of time and resources. It is therefore proposed to use the existing
mechanisms of criteria and indicators for SFM and the institutional arrangements for
verification in the context of forest “sinks” in the Kyoto Protocol.
A Market Mechanism Design to
Manage Caps for Forest Sinks
Cap Management Options
The design proposed here should allow to ensure that the potential contribution of forest
related LULUCF activities in the context of Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Protocol to the
reduction commitment laid down in the Kyoto Protocol is in line with the overall
objective of SFM. Only activities that can prove compatibility with SFM should then be
allowed in a GHG market mechanism designed to maximize the efficiency of total
reduction commitments.
The allowed share of the contribution of sinks to the total reduction commitment is a
political question. Figure 1 provides an overview of the three principle ways to obtain a
restricted contribution of LULUCF activities in a market to reduce net GHG emissions
to the atmosphere.
Figure 1 (I) illustrates the supply schedule of the benchmark case of a fully unrestricted
contribution of sinks. With reference to (II) the first possibility to manage a cap is by a
simple quantitative limitation of LULUCF projects. In this context a quantitative cap is
reflected by a simple normative rule stating that the share of carbon credits from
LULUCF activities is restricted to a certain amount. The allocation rule for the right to
deliver LULUCF carbon credits to the GHG market is then based on a first-come first-
serve basis. The second option, the qualitative cap (III), is an indirect way to reach a
certain quantitative target contribution by tightening criteria and increasing the number
of indicators that define eligibility. As outlined previously, criteria and indicator sets for
determining the quality of the sink or project in question can be used here. Considerable
work has been achieved regarding such sets globally. The IPCC (2000) lists the rates of
5potential carbon gains for selected practices for forest lands that are or can be part of
such criteria and indicator sets. The third option (IV) is a combination of the former
two, where the quantitative target of credits is fixed but a competitive mechanism for
project selection is introduced. Projects compete for criteria and indicator points for
either SFM or carbon sequestration, or a combination of the two.
Figure 1: Supply schedules of emission reductions and sinks under unconstrained
market conditions for LULUCF activities (I), under the introduction of a quantitative
cap (II), a qualitative cap (III), and under a quantitative cap for credits with additional
demands on SFM and/or carbon sequestration (IV). (Abscissa: quantities in tC (q);
Ordinate: Prices in $ per tC (p).)
Cap Management Options in Perspective
Table 1 evaluates the different ways of cap management using four criteria: (1) the
occurrence of arbitrage possibilities for LULUCF projects, (2) the possibility that
LULUCF projects can be allocated in a fair way among all potential suppliers, (3) the
quantitative target can be exactly be met, and (4) the degree of difficulty to
operationalize the instrument.
Emission
reduction
Sink
I II
III IV
q
p
q
p
q
p
q
p
6Table 1: Overview of the methods proposed for cap management.
No
Arbitrage
gap
Fair
Allocation
Meeting the
cap exactly
Difficulty to
operationalize
Quantitative cap (II) no no yes small
Qualitative cap (III) - yes no high
Quantitative cap & C&I (IV) yes yes yes small
As shown in Figure 1 (II) a quantitative cap would result in discontinuities of the supply
curve. Discontinuities lead to market distortion in the sense that there are a limited
number of relatively cheap LULUCF activities that could earn large profits without
taking additional efforts or risks. We call the difference between the market-clearing
price, which mostly reflects costs of emission reductions in the energy market, and the
cost of the individual LULUCF project the arbitrage gap.
The costs of emission reductions are expected to be much higher than LULUCF costs
for carbon sequestration. For example, forestry actions are estimated to cost about 1–10
US$ per MtC (see, e.g., Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 1999), while the lowest cost
estimates for emission reductions in the energy market start at 15–20 US$ per MtC (see,
e.g., Grubb, 2000; Karani, 2000), but are expected to exceed this level. Similar to quotas
in the production of oil set by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), a restriction of cheaper LULUCF activities will push the market clearing price
for carbon credits up with the consequence that LULUCF activities become highly
attractive (Figure 1 (II)), as a sink project can earn more carbon dollars on the national
or international market that is dominated by emission reduction in the energy sphere.
The result of the artificial quantitative cap are high profits for LULUCF activities that
participate in the GHG market. These profits are generated without additional efforts or
risks to be carried by the agent running the LULUCF activity ― resulting in an
arbitrage gap.
Possibilities for arbitrage will in turn lead to oversupply of such activities. If the
arbitrage gap is large the oversupply of highly profitable LULUCF projects will lead to
keen competition due to the artificial quantitative cap. However, due to these demand
rigidities introduced by the cap, prices will not be able to adjust and will stay at high
levels compared to LULUCF costs. This leads to a situation where a fair allocation is
impossible to generate on the basis of a price based mechanism. Price, as the only
information to clear the market, is not sufficient under such circumstances. With this
single criterium no other selection mechanism will be available other than a first-come
first-serve rule. In a situation of asymmetric information, which certainly will be the
case, a fair allocation of rights to deliver carbon credit from LULUCF activities will be
impossible to produce under such a market rule. In other words, those LULUCF players
that have a competitive advantage in ‘through the backdoor’ guessing will most likely
be able to earn large profits from arbitrage. The principles of equitable and fair
allocation are violated if such informational advantages are rewarded.
7The only practical way that is currently suggested to minimize the arbitrage gap is by
depreciating LULUCF activities by some lump-sum rate. For other reasons, many argue
that restrictive measures should indirectly reflect the higher uncertainty of net
sequestration of LULUCF projects (e.g., Gabus, 2001). Also the Pronk (2001) statement
suggests ‘discounted crediting to factor out non-direct human induced effects and to
address uncertainty’ under Article 2.4. However, such an approach to penalize for
uncertainty is not providing the right incentives to solve the uncertainty problem and
will also not eradicate the arbitrage gap. Uncertainty and arbitrage are idiosyncratic to
the project and only a penalty for uncertainty of individual projects would provide the
necessary incentives to reduce uncertainty of sequestration. Uncertainty has to be
treated by a different set of rules and more appropriate verification provisions (see,
Obersteiner et al., 2000b,c).
Besides efficiency and fairness considerations another drawback of a quantitative cap is
that there is no guarantee that LULUCF projects conform to the overall sustainable
development goal of the Kyoto Protocol. Social and environmental leakages especially
from LULUCF activities based on Article 3.3 can be substantial. There are already
numerous illustrative examples, mostly from CDM carbon plantation projects available,
that question the social and environmental integrity of ‘cheap’ LULUCF activities
(Koskela et al., 2000).
The second way to define a cap is by introducing qualitative criteria that LULUCF
activities must meet. In this way the quantitative cap of LULUCF in the carbon market
is reached indirectly. Meeting the additional criteria is usually costly and, if sufficiently
restrictive, the introduction of such criteria will shift the supply schedule of LULUCF
activities into a range where they will directly have to compete with energy projects as
illustrated in Figure 1 (III). However, various types of uncertainties make it impossible
to predict the final market share of LULUCF activities. First, uncertainties of current
cost levels of both LULUCF and energy activities are large (Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000).
Second, there is large uncertainty on the elasticity of additional requirements on the
costs of LULUCF activities. In addition, the transaction costs are potentially high as
new institutions will have to be built and capacity building in the business sector is a
slow process.
An alternative way to define a cap is to set a quantitative cap with additional qualitative
C&I for sustainable resource management and carbon management (see Figure 1 (IV)).
Such an approach would allow installing a market for “sink” activities based on a
competitive selection mechanism among suppliers of LULUCF projects geared towards
maximizing the potential contribution to the reduction goal of the Kyoto Protocol.
Competition for quantifiable actions for carbon sequestration or for sustainable resource
management closes the arbitrage gap and allows a fair allocation. In addition,
certification of SFM is a market driven approach where the international institutional
structures are already fully established and working. Carbon issues could readily be
integrated in such certification mechanisms on a worldwide scale benefiting from
previous experiences and institutional infrastructures.
8The accounting and additionality problem
The set of criteria and indicators used requires a design that allows rankings between
different alternatives. This can either be based on ordinal scale “star-ranking” for
activities with different sequestration or emission potential, actual increase of
sequestration or reduction of emissions, and on additional criteria to avoid leakages
such as incentives to establish fast growing monocultural plantations while being
ignorant to deforestation of natural old growth forests. Any reduction in the rate of
deforestation has the benefit of avoiding a significant source of carbon emissions
(especially in the tropics) and reducing other environmental and social problems
associated with deforestation. Possible additional criteria could be inter alia a
biodiversity index, additional criteria points on the management of existing forests.
As a first step, criteria additional to carbon sequestration could be derived from the
existing sets of criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management. Table 4-9 in
Chapter 4 of the IPCC (2000) report lists rates of potential carbon gain under selected
practices for forest land in various regions of the world. Most of the practices, such as
improved natural regeneration, preventing forest degeneration and others, form part of
the criteria and indicator sets already established.
With reference to Article 3.4 “changes in greenhouse gas emissions…and removals”,
implies that credit will be based on a comparison between two points in time or two
paths through time. Forest certification currently usually works on a 5-year period basis,
which would allow assessing differences between two points in time between 1990 and
the first commitment period. In such a case only changes with respect to SFM would be
honored.
Referring to Article 3.4, this requirement would suggest that the carbon stock change
during the commitment period should be compared with the carbon stock change during
the base period (1990). For LULUCF activities undertaken under Article 3.3, net
emissions are defined as the change in stocks during the first commitment period, 2008–
2012. In essence, this definition specifies that, for qualifying activities, carbon stocks in
2008 are the reference against which to measure carbon sequestration by Afforestation
Reforestation and Deforestation (ARD) during the first commitment period.
Furthermore, details with respect to carbon accounting, the system boundaries,
measuring and monitoring of carbon are still under discussion (see, e.g., IPCC, 2000;
Kirschbaum et al., 2000) and will be treated in greater depth separately in an IIASA
follow-up publication. It is stated that carbon accounting must be conducted in such a
way that they are real, additional and verifiable (see, discussion on these points in Jonas
et al., 1999). Issues of verifiability and treatment of uncertainties as discussed earlier
can be solved. Contrarily, the additionality concept, i.e., accounting for an error prone
difference with the counterfactual, is still poorly defined and full of loopholes.
However, in a competitive mechanism the baseline scenario is endogenously
determined through competition, i.e., projects that are not additional (perform better
than the baseline scenario) will not be competitive to begin with. Thus, this artificial
concept of additionality is not needed in the economic mechanism design proposed in
this paper.
9The mechanism design― Dutch tender auction
The Dutch tender auction mechanism (see, e.g., Obersteiner, 1998) shall ensure that a
fixed quantitative cap is achieved in a competitive setting without arbitrage gaps and a
fair allocation of approvals to high quality projects. In the auction mechanism
considered in this paper a qualifier indicator and an indicator for the competitive trait
must be considered. If the qualifier to enter the market is basic certification then the
competitive trait is the verifiable amount of carbon sequestered per carbon credit. If, on
the other hand, the qualifier is one unit of carbon sequestered then the competitive trait
must be the delivery of sustainability points per unit carbon. In both cases the price of
one carbon credit, i.e., the right to emit one unit of a GHG equivalent, is treated as given
and fixed (see, discussion on how to fix the price below).
So, for example, the Dutch auction with sustainability criteria as the competitive trait
works as follows:
Figure 2 describes in greater detail the Dutch tender auction for LULUCF contracts. A
central agency (e.g., a commodity exchange) auctions off to LULUCF suppliers the
right to deliver carbon sequestration credits at a fixed price. The price remains
unchanged throughout the auction. Given the fixed price for one unit of carbon
sequestration the auctioneer starts to collect bids for carbon sequestration of individual
suppliers at the maximum possible sum of sustainability points a project can collect.
Subsequently, the auctioneer lowers the points and collects bids at this lower total
sustainability level. The auctioneer continues to lower the points until the cap, which is
essentially a supply constraint, is filled by LULUCF projects (the lowering of the total
sum of indicator points is symbolized in Figure 2 by the thick line arrow). Competitive
bidding is not based on price or quantity but, in this particular mechanism design, is
based on bidding for the delivery of ‘sustainability points’ that a project promises to
collect. The collection of sustainability points is based on well-established criteria
indicator systems, which are already in use.
The contract between the central agency and the LULUCF projects must be a future
contract. This is due to the fact that LULUCF activities become measurable only after
some time lag until management changes become measurable in the biological
resource.1 Contrarily, a technological modernization of an industrial plant becomes
immediately measurable (disregarding leakage effects).
As already mentioned, the tender auction mechanism is used to generate an efficient and
fair allocation of future contracts where, in the proposed mechanism, the supplier
promises to deliver the product in the future and can expect a fixed financial return at
some point in time at the end or prior to the end of the contract period. Hence, in order
to operationalize the auction there must be a price forming mechanism prior to the end
of the contract period that allows determining the fixed financial return for the supplier
of the carbon sequestration. There are two possibilities (1) determine a market clearing
price prior to the end of the contract period (say 2005) by a bidding procedure; or (2)
1 Here, the question of the day when the promised criteria are due to be met and the carbon sequestration
is verified must still be solved. Ideally, the full contract should be measurable in nature by the end of
2012 so that accounting tricks are avoided.
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the auctioneer fixes a price based on market analysis and sells the contracts on a
speculative market that carries the risk of selling the contract at the end of the contract
period (2010–2012).
Figure 2: Supply scheme of the cap management mechanism by Dutch tender auctions
for carbon or sustainability points.
On the other side of the market the decision rule of an individual investor to enter a
LULUCF carbon market is defined in Box A (see, Appendix). Decision support can be
given by multiple criteria optimization techniques, which are also well established and
operational in the field of forestry (see, e.g., Hyttinen et al., 1995).
If the delivery of carbon sequestration units becomes the competitive trait and SFM
certification is the qualifier the mechanism works analogously. This type of mechanism
design appears to be the most practicable way to combine provisions for SFM with the
delivery of maximum carbon sequestration from forests within the framework of the
Kyoto Protocol. Also the institutional framework for the qualifier, i.e., a certificate
securing SFM, is already fully established and could easily be integrated in such a
scheme. The issues surrounding the competitive trait, i.e., the rules defining the
eligibility of carbon sequestration, are less established and are still under serious
discussion. The competitive trait itself, regardless of its definition, is defined by the
Points
tC
Points
tC
Points
tC
LULUCF Suppliers
Dutch Tender Auction
Points
tC
Cap level
Supply schedule
Demand for LULUCF carbon credits
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amount of carbon sequestered (under the respective accounting provisions) per carbon
credit. Under such a definition the mechanism proposed can also be viewed as a way to
idiosyncratically discount LULUCF projects in order to bring their price level up to the
energy market price level through the introduction of SFM provisions and competition
for carbon intensities per credit earned. It is also interesting to observe that eligibility
issues are becoming less important since LULUCF activities are self-restricting due to
competition under the auction mechanism. In fact, an artificially restricted LULUCF
contribution, i.e., a type of qualitative cap, would lead to efficiency losses and to losses
with respect to sustainability. Contrarily, however, accounting and verification will play
a more important role in an auction scheme as measurability of the ‘product’ is the key
ingredient in any anonymous market mechanism (e.g., North, 1997).
Discussion and Conclusion
The Kyoto Protocol envisages the first-ever international market mechanism for
environmental goods. It is now crucial to design the institutions of the GHG market
such that the integrity of the Convention and the Protocol with respect to sustainable
development is preserved. Cutajar (2000) mentions that the greatest challenge of the
COPs to come is to balance economic efficiency with the credibility of the use of
flexible mechanisms. The aim of the use of flexibilities and sinks is to seek lower costs
for achieving part of the target of the Kyoto Protocol.2 In this paper we ignored issues
related to notions of environmental integrity with respect to the question of whether
sinks should be used at all. We were interested in the question on how to make sink
activities more compatible with the broader goal of sustainable development by using
market mechanisms. Clearly, compatibility with other international agreements on the
use of natural resources will help to preserve the environmental integrity of carbon
sequestration activities.
In the Kyoto Protocol negotiation phase there was, at least on paper, broad consensus
that carbon sequestration activities, if used in one way or the other, should be aligned
with sustainable development objectives. Although there is widespread agreement on
this issue, it is stunning to see that there were no provisions for sustainable resource
management proposed so far. The currently discussed rules for sink activities to be
eligible for inclusion in the carbon market do not ensure that sustainability criteria are
met by sink projects in addition to carbon sequestration. Thus, the environmental
integrity of LULUCF activities is not guaranteed under the currently discussed
provisions.
The flexibility of the proposed mechanism defines an adaptive efficient carbon market.
The appropriate set of carrots and sticks is crucial for the functioning of any market
mechanism. The international market mechanism needs to reflect the current knowledge
about the goods and actors in the market so that the environmental good, reduction of
net fluxes of GHG to the atmosphere, is delivered according to the Articles of the
2 The auction mechanism proposed in this paper will necessarily lead to efficiency improvements in the
sense that total costs for reduced GHG fluxes to the atmosphere will be smaller under the inclusion of
LULUCF activities.
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Convention and the Protocol (see, e.g., Sugiyama, 2001). The proposed mechanism is
simple and flexible in its nature and can be well integrated in the currently discussed
provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and international processes concerning SFM. The
mechanism also carries the potential to reduce the seemingly unresolvable complexity
of the sink problem significantly by decentralizing the decision making process, which
in the end leads to a self-restriction of activities by still preserving economic efficiency.
Under the proposed provision the policy makers could still preserve the environmental
credibility of the Kyoto package by including LULUCF activities. The decisions for
policy makers require little technical knowledge in the field of LULUCF activities and
are thus easy to negotiate. Most of the complexity of the issue is transferred to a
decentralized and competitive scheme of decision making.3 Policy makers would have
to decide only on the share of LULUCF contributions to the Quantified Emission Limit
and Reduction Commitment (QELRC) and whether the share applies to the country
level or total market share. Such simple decisions are purely political in their nature and
are relatively easy to negotiate in comparison with the current questions of dispute. In
fact, these two questions are negotiated as such at the ‘current’ COP 6. Due to the
simplicity of the proposed mechanism a compromise can probably be generated in a
relatively short time (see Box 1).
Due to competition the provisions lead to self-organized restriction in the scope of
different sink activities without a priori physical restrictions of potential sink activities.
The very issue of differences among Parties on the scope of what activities are eligible
for carbon crediting is resolved by a transparent and efficient market mechanism that is
defined through sets of criteria and indicators. This market mechanism would not only
3 The proposed mechanism can be applied to both a restricted or unrestricted set of LULUCF activities.
Box 1: Decision making schedule to implement LULUCF tender auctions
1. Tender mechanism:
1.1 Qualifier: Certification for SFM
Competitive trait: Carbon sequestration intensities per GHG emission credit.
1.2 Qualifier: Unit carbon sequestration per GHG emission credit
Competitive trait: Sustainability points according to C&Is.
2. Definition of eligibility, accounting rules and verification requirements.
3. Contribution of LULUCF activities to QELRC:
3.1 Applies to the national target.
3.2 Applies to the international target.
4. Mechanism to determine benchmarking price:
4.1 Competitive bidding for LULUCF credits prior to 2010.
4.2 Initially determined by a market maker.
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produce an efficient allocation of a multi-criteria environmental and social good, but
also lead to a fair allocation among LULUCF project suppliers. Moreover, self-
organized restriction is more prone to reflect the peculiarities of the site conditions and
thus lead to site-specific adaptation of LULUCF activities. In addition, the error prone
concept of environmental, social and financial additionality becomes unnecessary in a
competitive environment.
The institutional framework of the Protocol aiming at reducing the net emission of
GHGs in a sustainable manner looks more like a traditional regulatory command-and-
control method that exclusively deals with GHGs. Such methods have so far proven to
be very ineffective to push technology frontiers and institutional best practice (Victor et
al., 1998). Real technological and institutional change that induces a reduction of the
total environmental rucksack, including the carbon footprint, in a sustainable manner
can thrive only in an economic environment that fosters creativity and innovation in a
decentralized decision making mode. The Protocol is lacking these elements of
business-friendly approaches that are workable and pragmatic and that are at the same
time effective with respect to broader development goals. Thus, an incentive structure
must come into action that honors business performance in terms of its totality of social,
environmental and economic values. Image score improvement by economic agents
must also be trackable by outside stakeholders (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). In the case
of forest management such a process is already materializing by the introduction of
forest certification schemes. With respect to economic performance competitive bidding
as an instrument to allocate financial resources to alternative energy suppliers have
proved to be superior to traditional restrictive command-and-control methods (Klaassen
et al., 2001) The auction mechanism presented in this paper is a natural extension of
both the process of SFM and the Kyoto process and preserves integrity, transparency
and is business friendly. In contrast to novel command-and-control provisions for
LULUCF activities (e.g. eligibility and additionality) discussed at COP 6 in The Hague,
both forest certification schemes and mechanisms of competitive bidding are way ahead
of the experimental stage.
C&I and mechanisms of competitive bidding are fully established and are already
implemented by market actors all over the world. Not only would one benefit from the
institutional learning from these processes, but LULUCF entrepreneurs could also start
using already fully established instruments that are widely accepted and successfully
used by the market actors. In addition, the LULUCF entrepreneur could expect
additional market or non-market benefits from the natural resource holding.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the proposed mechanism can after some
modification, be or even should be equally applied to energy projects under CDM, joint
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol or any other subsidy scheme on national and
international levels.
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Appendix
The decision rule for a LULUCF supplier to participate in a Kyoto market consists of a
comparison of the expected return from an LULUCF investment in a Kyoto market with
a risk-free portfolio. Returns depend on the price of GHG emission credits and
additional benefits from joint production such as image scoring due to certification for
SFM, and finally on the costs of production. Those costs can be roughly divided into
transaction costs (e.g., certification, verification, monitoring, consultancy) and costs for
operation (e.g., silvicultural costs, harvesting). Decision support tools are relatively easy
to build once carbon accounting prescriptions will be available.
BOX A: Decision rule for a potential LULUCF supplier to
participate in the GHG market given competition rules
that are based on carbon sequestration or C&I points
( ) rTtTiiTii eqcpCICIPpCICIP pi≥−>+> −− )()()( *
)( ii CICIP −> Probability that the CI value of the project i is larger than those of the
losing –i projects.
pT Market price of one GHG emission credit at time T.
*
Tp Market price of all joint products of sequestration and SFM at time T.
c(q) Average cost of the LULUCF project. The average cost is a function of the
quantity supplied due to diminishing marginal transaction costs.
*
tpi Return from a risk-free portfolio at time t over T periods with a guaranteed
interest-rate r.
